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Abstract
With the grave state of social conditions in American cities
today, the act of participation facilitates a citizen's pursuit of
change in his life. Community organization is the mode through
which effective participation can occur.
The purpose of this thesis is to compare two models of citizen
participation that are both based on the democratic theory, yet
differ in their empowerment potentials. The federal government's
Citizen Action Program (CAP) serves as the first model and Saul
Alinsky's approach to community organizing is the other. Prior to
the exploration of the two models, the necessity of citizen
participation will be explored.
Upon establishing the importance and purpose of citizen
participation, the structure of the thesis is as follows. An
exploration is made into CAP, the Office of Economic Opportunity's
attempt at a "War on Poverty" in the 1960s, with the conclusion that
the federal government, reacting to strong political pressures,
created ineffective policy due to a flaw in the liberal design. The
vulnerability of CAP to political pressures due to funding
1
controversy was this critical flaw. Then a presentation is made of
Alinsky's organizational model that serves as a guideline for
community participation, with the understanding that the whole
premise of success is based upon actual organizational structures
being created by the people for each specific community. The
organization is based on the results of natural evolution of events,
orchestrated by citizens of the community, not outside elements.
The conclusions of this thesis find that while there are no
theoretical contradictions between CAP and Alinsky's community
organizations, Alinsky's approach facilitates more lasting forms of
citizen participation based on inherent ideologies, rather than
political agendas.
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Introduction
The turmoil in America's inner-city neighborhoods can not be
eliminated, or even lessened with a sure solution. Instead of
providing, or even seeking a solution, more attention is directed at
placing the blame on some other party. Experts blame the apathy of
the poor and citizens blame the stagnant bureaucracy. Democrats
blame the Republicans for cutting funding to the cities and the
Republicans blame the Democrats for creating ineffective policies.
Little inquiry is conducted within the actual affected populations as
to what they see the problems to be. Whether through mere
oversight, or a disregard for their ability to judge their own
situations, the poor remain without a voice.
Meanwhile, as the seemingly insurmountable problems of
drugs, crime, homelessness, illiteracy and disease grow larger, the
fortunate few move further into the suburbs. There they attempt to
forget those who are left behind in the decaying slums. It takes a
riot to briefly remind the populace that there is anything wrong. As
soon as the smoke clears and the media move on, so does the
3
attention of the public at-large. A few politicians may make
appearances during election years, but the conditions do not change,
'C.
except when they get worse.
To date the inner-cities have essentially been abandoned by all
except for the impoverished and powerless who cannot get out. The
inner-city neighborhoods throughout America used to be the way
station to the American Dream. The inner city resident did not
intend to stay there forever and worked hard to effect his escape to
the suburbs. In these neighborhoods now are the under-represented
poor and minorities who have nowhere to turn. They are abandoned
there with the broken-down cars and the burned-out buildings that
line the streets. If their inner city neighborhood becomes the focus
for urban redevelopment and gentrification, they do not benefit from
the change; in fact, they are often displaced and become homeless.
Throughout this thesis the term "citizen" will refer
specifically to the poor in a neighborhood, town, or city who lack
- adequate and effective representation, as well as the non-poor who
may share the condition of powerlessness and isolation with the
lower classes. This use of "citizen" may also be reflected in terms
such as "have-nots," "poor," "powerless," and "underprivileged."
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One of the goals of this thesis is to endorse an approach to
encouraging actual citizen participation in active change. It is my
belief that the healing in our cities must begin from within. To
make an attempt at solving any of the existing problems without a
fundamental base in the communities will not produce the stability
and effectiveness necessary for lasting change. It is my contention
that in a true democracy this fundamental base can be established
through non-governmental, community organizations. The desire to
form such community groups is to create a common bond, other than
despair, between neighbors. Through its makeup and organization,
groups could instill crucial motivation to participate and create an
outlet for citizens' previously negative reactions.
The first chapter of this thesis explores the history of the
various popular opinions of the poor, from Aristotle to the present
and attitudes about citizen participation from which contemporary
public policy has evolved. In particular, reasons for governmental
response to grass roots organizing at the community level are
sought. The "poverty cycle", Le. the feelings of inadequacy and
powerlessness which plunge lower classes further into the state of
poverty, is examined.
5
To combat the "poverty cycle" and override the popular notion
of the apathetic poor, the potential benefits of unified action and
participation of citizens are introduced. The benefits include
increased dignity and self-sufficiency. The call for action by the
citizens is in direct defiance of the popular notion of the poor's
apathy. The sources identified throughout this thesis disregard this
notion of apathy and believe unanimously that with an effective
vehicle for their participation, any lingering feelings of apathy will
disappear and an atmosphere conducive to positive change is created.
Activity in a common community project can also create feelings of
worth and usefulness that cannot be found standing in line for
welfare.
Within a geographical area, specifically inner-city
neighborhoods, exists an inherent ideology that is best articulated
by its residents. The needs and desires of the community, no matter
how complex or diverse, are best promulgated by the citizens
involved. When the bureaucracy has been unable to adequately
represent the lower classes who, in a divided state, are unable to
change the problems within the bureaucracy, creation of community
organizations are a natural reaction. When a community bands
6
together for the common good, it creates a force with which to be
reckoned.
In Chapter Two the first of the models is presented. The
experiences of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) through
Citizen Action Programs (CAP) are examined. The attempts of CAP
were applications of ineffective policies upon communities often
under the misleading guise that they encouraged citizen
participation. While undertaking a war on poverty, the OEO failed to
back the efforts of its programs when controversy arose. A standard
form of bureaucracy was created rather than the desired social
action needed in the cities. Negative political pressures from local
governments due to federal money bypassing the establishment led
to the OEO's eventual demise. CAP. as a model for citizen
participation, serves as a specific example of the futility of the
federal government's role in community organizing.
The concept of community organization was put to the test by
the OEO, but it ultimately failed because it lacked the crucial
element of ratification by the citizens effected. In theory,
organizing a community is based on the residents' plans and efforts,
as well as ratification. The measure of effectiveness is gaged by
7
the changes that mayor may not occur in accordance with the
desires of the residents. In order to achieve stability and
effectiveness, there must be some form of mandate by these people.
In Chapter Three the model that incorporates this theory is
presented with the understanding that the premise for success of
these groups is based on the structure's details being formulated by
the people. Using Saul Alinsky's approach to organizing, this model
is drawn from case studies, as well as Alinsky directly. In addition,
various other forms of community organizations are introduced. The
incorporation of as many groups as possible under one umbrella
organization in a community is a ,fundamental element to the
potential success of the proposed model. Stability is created by
pulling all the organized resources a community has to offer into the
effort. Citizens, a sense of community, and democratic ideals used
together can create an effective climate for change in a previously
-
stagnant arena. With the two models examined in Chapters Two and
Three, the conclusion is drawn that the first suffers from a fatal
flaw in its liberal design, and that the second, while possibly
limited in its potential empowerment capabilities, is solidly based
on the democratic theory.
8
~hapter 1
Citizen Participation
THE DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION - IS A
DENIAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S OWN WORTH AND A
CONFIRMATION OF HIS OWN IMPOTENCY AND SUBSERVIENCE.
Edgar S. Cahn in Citizen participation
Introduction
The question at hand is why a representative government
should accommodate citizens actively involved in public decision
making. Our founding fathers advised against it. Hamilton argued
that sound administration would win the people's allegiance, making
their direct involvement unnecessary. Madison specifically
demanded the exclusion of common people. They reasoned that
whereas the government was by the people, it was also for the
people and therefore it was the leaders' duty to protect the people
from their own ignorance and delusions. This philosophy has been
the basis of public policy through the years within American
9
political administration.
Subsequently throughout history, Americans have viewed the
plight of the lower classes with one of two attitudes. Sociologist
Kenneth Clark (1969) identifies these attitudes as the "Puritan-
Horatio Alger Tradition" and the "Good Samaritan-Lady Bountiful
Tradition."1 Drawing from Darwinism and early Puritan traditions,
the "Horatio Alger" tradition is the pulling of oneself up by the boot
straps. With this concept, poverty is a direct result of the moral
fiber and personal characteristics of those affected. If anyone were
to intervene with aid or guidance, the natural order of society would
be disrupted. The moral strength and motivation of these people
will deteriorate as a result. On their own, the disadvantaged are
expected to get their lives in such an order as to be in accordance
with the standards of surrounding society. The poor souls that
remain impoverished and without a voice are meant to be that way;
those citizens that manage to get ahead are worthy, and thus a
benefit to society.
In a more compassionate contrast, the "Good Samaritan-Lady
1 Kenneth B. Clark, A Relevant War Against Poverty (New York: Metropolitar
Applied Research Center, 1969), p. 19.
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Bountiful" tradition is based on the belief that when a person is
down all that is necessary to remedy the situation is to give a little
charity. According to the critics of this theory, it keeps the poor
quiet and makes the wealthy feel good about themselves. The poor
are then expected to take handouts and reform themselves with a
better existence. In the process of creating a "representative
democracy," the elitist ruling logic of the framers and the
moralistic traditions of reform produced a quagmire of public policy
inaction and misrepresentation of the poor.
Public policy, historically, has created the environment for the
"poverty cycle."2 When the poor attempt to get out of the state of
poverty on their own, as Horatio Alger suggests, they become
frustrated by their inability to affect the system around them. What
little motivation they once had is lost in the struggle. This leads to
feelings of inadequacy, plunging them deeper into the "poverty
cycle." The system is not responsive to these citizens. The
exhortations: "Stand on your own two feet"; and "become self-
sufficient" ring hollow when an official, by acting unilaterally, in
2 Dennis R. Judd, The Politics of American Cities (Illinois: Scott, Foresman
and Co., 1988), p. 315.
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effect officially states his lack of trust in the capacity, the
instinctive reactions, the intelligence, and the sensitivity of the
individual. "3 As a result, complete indifference to the long-term
aspects of public action is found within the lower classes. The
approach to remedying the situation is not the creation of Utopia.
Power is still necessary within modern community relations. Some
will rule, others will be ruled. The theory of pursuing citizen
participation is how to determine and implement policy while taking
into account the interests and concerns of the masses.4
It is my contention that the cure for poverty is neither
individual self-help, nor sporadic acts of charity. True democracy
requires unified action by the people involved for the purpose of
challenging unequal opportunities and institutional barriers. The
traditions stated above are only part of the reason why the poor find
it so difficult to incorporate themselves within public policy.
Limitations exist within current political systems despite attempts
3 Edgar S. and Jean Camper Cahn, "Citizen Participation," Citizen
Participation in Urban Development, Vol. I, Hans B. C, Spiegel, Ed. (Washington, D.
National Institute for Applied Behavioral Sciences, 1968), p. 219.
4 Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University oj
North Carolina Press, 1968).
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towards reform. The closed policy-making machinery's inability to
accept the potential benefits from participation is due to the fear of
damaging the existing relationships of power and decision in the
community. The frustrations with a system that does not respond to
..... citizens' needs and concerns engulf the poor with feelings of
alienation and despair. This chapter is devoted to the concept of
citizen participation as a vehicle to bring the lower classes into the
public arena as players. The focus is on the exploration of potential
and real benefits to be derived from citizen participation.
"Participation is the means through which dissatisfactions find
public expression."5 Rights of the citizens to their roles within the
political arena cannot be underestimated. Effective participation is
the influencing of policy with an effect on the citizens involved.
The "Fallacy of Monolithic Man"
The argument for elitist control of public institutions is
based on the paternalistic belief that the poor are not qualified to
5 Robert Bailey, Jr., Radicals in Urban Politics: The Alinsky Approach
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 118.
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make decisions regarding policies that affect them. Public leaders
"stand guilty of having structured a situation where the poor may
speak only in one capacity - asking for help, acknowledging need, and
dependency. "6 With this "fallacy of monolithic man," officials bear
the sole responsibility for making the chc;>jces, but do not have to
- - ~"fJ..~~~ -----tc;------ ~--.... ------.- --- -
bear the burden of experiencing direct consequences. They do not
have to live with the end results of their policies. Floyd Hunter
(1953) writes of a community where the ruling council of
handpicked leaders review the conditions of relief for the needy.
Often the findings, such as the need for aid or larger grants, are not
acted upon and filed for future reference by subsequent committees.
"The community structure is not adequate to express effectively the
demands that are real enough, but which reside with the silent
members of the community."7 If the community that was affected
played a more integral part in the analysis and execution stages of
the process then the problems would not be shelved without
resolution. The leaders do not have the necessary attachment or
connection to the situation. No one feels ultimately responsible to
6 Cahn, p. 217.
7 Hunter, p. 243.
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act. The silent members must have an effective way to break their
silence.
Harry C. Boyte (1990) reports that the majority of existing
strategies for citizen participation (via education) are based on
moralized Qolitics; Qressing citizens to "putaside"utbeIr self-
--- -r
interest on behalf of some hypothetical common good. While
Neorepublican theorists claim that the notion of citizen is
unintelligible apart from that of the commonwealth, in reality the
"inflamed moral language cannot engage a citizenry with vast
differences in moral traditions; and it is too one-dimensional for a
world full of complexity and ambiguity."s Contrary to the classic
republican theory, where virtuous citizens put aside their interests
for the common good, reality calls for ordinary people to reclaim
authority for community concerns. The revitalization of public life
through citizen politics is a positive approach to sustaining a
community. Extensive diversities are found throughout urban
America. According to Boyte, rather than assuming that "we are
all the same," (which unfairly favors dominant cultural groups), the
SHarry C. Boyte, "The Growth of Citizen Politics: Stages in Local Communi
Organizing," Dissent v.37, 1990, p. 513.
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presumption of difference should be understood and accepted. This
leads to a recognition of the existing moral ambiguity of politics, an
awareness upon which we cannot simply impose our values.
Accountability, respect, and recognition of all citizens are
_princjpJes-that~should __be_rnadepl'Ominent_~Mse principles allow
people to lessen personal vulnerabilities and concentrate on public
skills.9 With a liberal concept of citizenship the stage is set for a
pursuit of effective participation.
For effective participation to be possible it is necessary for a
restructuring of forums and institutions where the decisions that
effect the people can be influenced by the people. When the issue is
not whether the· citizens can be trusted to make such decisions, the
focus can be how the decision-making process can be structured so
as to "increase the likelihood that the decision will be reached in an
appropriately deliberative, carefully considered, and rationally
chosen fashion" 10 by the citizens effected. Beyond mere political
rhetoric, in theory, the formation of a coalition of private and public
interests for discourse, whether at school board or town meetings,
9 Boyte, p. 517.
10 Cahn, p. 213.
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could facilitate the transition from protest to actual problem
solving by citizens.
E.stabHshirl9 Reason~ .fo.r ... Citizen Particil?a!~on
Robert Bailey, Jr. (1974) has documented reactions of citizens
who involved themselves in the political process to the benefit of
their community. A sample of the comments gathered after the fact
support the thesis that participation instills much needed self-
worth.
Several reported that participation had given their life a sense
of direction or worthwhileness. When asked what
participation meant to her, one divorced woman replied, 'It has
made my children proud of me.' Most - feel their participation
has stimulated personal change and development. 11
One of the earliest theorists to preach the idea of active
citizenship was Aristotle. He defined the role of the active citizen
as being composed of exercising practical wisdom in the public
interest and rendering decisive judgment about some aspect of
11 Bailey, p. 131.
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governance. 12 Benjamin Barber (1984) adds to Aristotle's argument
in claiming that the practice of active citizenship is not only an
instrument to the achievement of larger aims but also has value in
its own right. 13
E~gar and Jean Cahn outline three fundamental. reasons for
citizen participation. These reasons are comprised of logic and
common sense that can not be shelved as romantic and idealistic
notions. Using terms that public policy leaders can understand, the
Cahns identify the untapped "resources" within the citizenry and the
solutions to many of the problems that have plagued the inner-city
neighborhoods which lie within the reach of them.
The first of the reasons, cited by the Cahns, is for the purpose
of promoting dignity and self-sufficiency. Effective participation
constitutes affirmative activity in pursuit of this purpose. "An
exercise of the very initiative, the creativity, the self-reliance, the
faith that specific programs such as education, job training, housing
and urban renewal, health, consumer education, and others seek to
12 Aristotle, The Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), trans. T. A.
Sinclair.
13 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Ac
'"(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
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instill" is facilitated through participation within the system. 14
The dignity and self-worth of an individual are more important to
his future security than endless handouts. "When a grown man is
treated as a child, with respect to those very services being
rendered him, he is unlikely to view those seNices as anything other
rituals of humiliation designed either to prove his incapacity to
function or to keep him dependent and out of trouble."15
There is an increase in the sense of self-worth in citizens that
engage in a productive effort to improve their community.
"Community involvement provides most [citizens] with a sense of
fulfillment and a justification for their existence which would
otherwise be lacking."16 If they have the opportunity to see
themselves effectively involved within the system, rather than
simply voicing the desire to have needs satisfied, they may be able
to develop improved practices and make wiser judgments. Positive
feelings derived from involvement are very evident in the following
remarks made by a community activist from Chicago:
14 Cahn, p. 213.
15 Cahn, p. 219.
16 Bailey, p. 143.
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Participation has changed me. It has broadened my vision of
life and what can be done when people work together. It has
made me more secure personally and more trustful. In general
I'd say that the community organization has done more for me
than I have for it.1 7
Secondly, citizen participation, if utilized properly, is a means
of mobilizing the limited resources and energies of the poor - of
converting the poor from passive consumers of the services of
others, into producers of those services. An effective by-product is
produced through incorporating the poor into the process of renewal:
untapped manpower resources. Instead of bringing in workers to do
services, such as cleaning the streets, restoring buildings, and
monitoring crime, the citizens of the community should be able to
contribute their efforts. Through such participation a
transformation can be made to acting in a capacity other than as
consumers in addition to taking pride in their community.
Subsequent to being included in the process of determining reforms
and delegations, communities will be able to facilitate any activity
of reform assigned to them.
A priceless source of information also lies within the
17 Robert Bailey, Jr., Radicals in Urban Politics: The Alinsky Approach
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 131.
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perspectives of the people in need. The leaders concerned with
fulfilling the needs of the poor historically have not turned to the
poor to discover what these needs actually are, with the
presumption that the government knows best. "We have paid in the
past for failure to take into account this source of corrective
knowledge concerning the defects, inequities, and false assumptions
on which these [renewal] programs are based."18 The people must
live with the end results of any endeavor made. Therefore it is
beneficial not to further ignore the insights of the citizens'
experience and knowledge.
In accord with the Cahns, Camilla Stivers (1990) composed a
list of four definitive attributes of active citizenship:
1. Authoritative action. Citizens engage directly in some aspect of
governance, involving the exercise of determinative judgment. The
authority of the active citizen is both structural and interactive,
both grounded in law and acted out with others. Active citizens are
legally empowered to make public decisions and respected because
of the wise counsel they provide. Their authority is limited, but
with respect to the responsibilities they are assigned, it is decisive.
2. Consideration of the public interest. Citizens' authoritative
action is
18 Cahn, p. 220.
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animated by concern for the public interest. The term 'the public
interest'
connotes consideration of the full range of policy effects; as a
binding (because governmental) norm, it implies the existence of an
objective standard of judgement.
3. Learning. Through the exercise of decisive judgment in the
public interest, citizens learn to judge wisely, and develop aspects
of their beings that can be developed in no other way. They become
political persons.
4. Relationship. In acting together for the public interest, citizens
form a political community, a polis, which is the space or arena
within which participants achieve common aims, handle conflict,
constitute and carry forward shared values, and in doing so, lead a
virtuous Iife.19
The potential results cannot be ignored. In a study of
Northeastern cities that had successfully reinvigorated their
economies, researchers have found that the communities within had
developed a shared vision of their futures.2o This shared vision was
the result of recognizing the numerous diversities, along racial,
class, and ethnic lines, within communities today. The realization
19 Camilla Stivers, "The Public Agency as a Polis: Active Citizenship in thE
Administrative State," Administration and Society v.22, 1990, p. 88.
20 William Potapchuk, "Citizenry Puts New Meaning to 'Consent of the
Governed'," Nation's Cities Weekly v.14, 1991.
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was made that no one perspective can command an automatic
majority. The basis of a successful community must be bui.lt on the
collaborative processes of citizen participation. The use of
collaboration is no longer just pragmatic politics; it is the result of
changing electorates and the fact that the expression of consent has
broadened beyond simply casting a ballot. William Potapchuk (1991)
argues that the act of collaboration between citizens and their
public officials can forge consensus across diverse constituencies
on difficult issues. With this process, each sector of the community
is able to contribute and work toward a cumulative impact on their
vision of the future. The collaborative process democratizes
decision making.21
As a result, the lower classes, acting in their capacity as
citizens, will be able to adjust and, if necessary, sacrifice present
consumption to secure their futures. This can be in the formation of
capital and investment. The point is that the very individual who
asks for help is quite capable, in the context of a community
meeting or group discussion, of saying that resources should not be
totally devoted to providing service in crisis situations. Despite any
21 Potapchuk.
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significant immediate need, the poor will be able to identify when
attention should be given to plans for the future. They are capable
of insisting that substantial resources be diverted in order to create
significant social change.22 The Cahn's reason that people do not
live happily with scarcity, with deprivations, - but they reconcile
themselves to those scarcities, those deprivations if they have had a
voice in choosing between X and V, if the scarcity they live with is
one of their own choosing. Satisfaction with the resulting policies
can be drawn from the belief that one's views were heard in public
discourse and respectfully considered by the decision makers.
"Involvement gives [the citizens] a greater stake in both the local
community and the society at large."23
The procedures and results of union labor negotiations are
examples of the theory at work. The basis of the negotiations, the
principle of collective bargaining, is also the basis of citizen
participation. Union members settle for the end result of contract
negotiations, even if it is less than what they wanted, because "they
feel they have been fairly and adequately represented in a process
22 Cahn.
23 Bailey, p. 143.
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where the terms of the contract are established by bargaining in
good faith."24 Good faith is the missing element within public
policy as it stands. With effective citizen participation, good faith
can be achieved. Greater satisfaction with outcomes is possible
because the process legitimatizes diverse perspectives. Cities, like
management, when reluctant to compromise because of potential
loss of money or power will have to deal with the consequences.
With unions this may be through strikes; within the cities the
results can be civil unrest, civil disobedience, and riots.
Overcoming Limitations to Effective Participation
Existing within most political systems are numerous
limitations to effective participation. The institutional and political
factors such as embedded class bias within local government, a lack
of goal consensus, and unwillingness among elected officials to
trust citizen participants serve as considerable hurdles to
overcome. In addition, the initial limited interest in participating
within community events and ignorance about political structures
24 Cahn, p. 221-2.
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serve to inhibit the public from getting involved. Existing
structures designed for participation are often technically
inadequate. Socio-cultural barriers make hearings inaccessible and
public forums are dominated by unrepresentative interest groups.
"The forum of political discussion is characterized as a program of
sound bites and bandwagoning, with 'the need for further study' as a
response to public concerns being too often used."25 The Kettering
Foundation identifies the inability for solutions to come from within
the system: "If you legislate a solution, people will just get around
it ... it's more realistic to start with the people, and getting them
more involved."26 Jon Martin and Lyn Kathlene (1991) recommend
that planners and analysts take a more proactive role in the process,
in order to overcome the limitations to citizen participation.
In order for the planners and analysts to assume a more
proactive role, it is first necessary for them to shed any hesitancy
regarding the citizens assuming more power. Hunter found leaders
reluctant to reform because of the fear of damaging existing
25 Thomas Sullivan, "Citizens and Politics: A View From Main Street,"
Nation's Cities Weekly v.14, 1991, p. 8.
26 Sullivan, p. 8.
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relations of power and decision-making in the community. These
leaders were afraid to have political questions raised without their
consent.27 With the concern being the maintenance of established
order, policy-making machinery and lines of communication will
remain closed.
Martin and Kathlene present conceptual suggestions to create a
more proactive role to induce change generally. They assert that
information and decision makers must be made more accessible to
the citizens, before the decisions are made. It is important that the
citizens be able to develop a critical understanding of the political
situation and issues relevant to their own lives. The breadth of
issues open for consideration by citizens should be expanded.
Finally, a true cross-section must be taken from the community to
insure proper representation.28
Potapchuk describes a concise plan to facilitate effective
participation. He agrees with Martin and Kathlene's model of
enhancing information sources and making public policy accessible.
27 Hunter.
28 Jon A. Martin and Lyn Kathlene, "Citizens' Panel: An Effective Participat
Forum in Policy Formulation," Nation's Cities Weekly, v.14, 1991.
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But he develops the theories into further detail, offering the
following points:
- develop a common definition of the problem,
- help participants educate each other,
- identify multiple viable options,
- make decisions by consensus,
share in implementation, and
share in responsibilities and successes. 29
Directly related to Potapchuk's model are the values and rights
of the citizens. These values and rights are essential to proper
enactment of civic participation. They include: The right of
effective speech, to be wrong, to be different, to influence
decisions, to contribute, to consume with dignity, and to maintain a
continuing share in this society's burdens and benefits.3o Officials
often lose sight of these rights due to the complicated and faceless
bureaucracy that entangles public process.
With changes of structural conditions, together citizens and
leaders can transform the public policy setting into an authentic
polis: a public place in which people with different perspectives
29 Potapchuk, p. 6.
30 Cahn.
28
join to decide what to do and to act together for the public good. It
is not the purpose of this chapter to go further into the intricate
details of executing citizen participation. In the subsequent
chapters, the atte'mpts of furthering effective participation through
two different models, will be explored.
29
Chapter 2
An Ineffective "War On Poverty"
They want rain without the thunder and lightning, the
ocean without the terrible roar.
Reaction to the OED by James Farmer
Director, Congress of Racial Equality
Introduction
In the search for a viable model to organize a community for
participation, the federal government might be considered a
reasonable architect. Contrary to this assumption it is the purpose
of this chapter to illustrate the ineffectiveness of a program for
citizen participation that is created and organized by the federal
government. The conditions leading up to a successful community
organization are essentially limited by being created and regulated
by an already established political institution. The "War on Poverty"
created by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration in the mid-sixties
is the example to be used. In the review of the planning and
implementation processes of this particular program within
30
Johnson's social agenda, the reasons why it is not within the realm
of the federal government to effectively organize will become
apparent.
The underlying goal of the "War on Poverty" programs was to
empower the poor. Through local agencies, the under-represented
were to be given a voice and a mode for change. In the process of
attempting to organize and motivate inner-city citizens, the federal
government began to threaten established local authority. As a
result, political pressures and strong interest groups fought to
undermine the social agenda and were eventually successful.
Despite its honorable intentions, the federal government, as will be
described in greater detail to follow, ultimately gave in to the
sentiments of the powerful establishment. A more effective mode
of participation (to be discussed in Chapter 3) finds its roots in
many of the policies created under the Johnson administration. Yet,
it is the force that is behind the implementation that is in question.
The ideas within the "War on Poverty" were promising, but the
commitment to change suffered under the bureaucratic and political
pressures.
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The State of Affairs
As the scope of the government's power increased in the
twentieth century, so did the citizens' needs for a way to protect
themselves against seemingly arbitrary acts of governmental
authority. This was especially true for the traditionally under-
represented, poor population. The· desire for bureaucratic
enfranchisement by a community's poor residents in their local
governments came out of the need for influence or, at the very least,
input into the public process. Lack of responsiveness by the public
officials promoted the attitude that the people who were the issue
could better deal with the problems. Through bureaucratic
enfranchisement, citizens could influence the manner in which
public agencies or program objectives were implemented.
In 1962, a book by Michael Harrington disturbed what had been
perceived as a stable social order. In The Other America the subject
of extensive poverty in America was brought out into the open.
Readers were led on a journey through the most impoverished areas
of the country, areas which had been historically overlooked by the
general populace and neglected by the media. Harrington exposed the
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enormous degrees of want and desperation that exist despite
national plenty. He attacked the "general assumption that the 'poor
are that way because they are afraid to work,' rather, 'the real
explanation of why the poor are where they are is that they made the
mistake of being born to the wrong parents, in the wrong section of
the country, in the wrong industry, or in the wrong racial or ethnic
group."'1
Harrington suggested that the dimensions of the problem were
so great that the implementation of a Federal government program
to combat poverty was the only solution. In addition, the American
conscience had to grasp the "invisible subculture of poverty" before
any real progress could be made.
In the year before President John F. Kennedy's death, the issue
of poverty had earned the attention of high-level bureaucrats in the
Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of Labor, as well as
the Executive office. Pressures from society were demanding action
by the federal government across many subject headings. Expanding
class cleavages and the growing civil rights movement were igniting
1 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (N ev
York: MacMillan, 1962), p. 14.
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the black and white populations, especially in areas of great poverty.
A new area of controversy and debate was being raised over the
linking of the issue of political discrimination to economic
discrimination. The stage was being set for the federal government
to take action on behalf of the impoverished members of society.
The political atmosphere at the time was highly conducive to such a
liberal-minded program.
As a result, plans for a poverty program were in the
preliminary stages of development when Lyndon B. Johnson took
office.. Eager to make an early impact in the area of public policy,
Johnson told those involved in the program's planning: "Go ahead.
Give it the highest priority. Push ahead full tilt. "2
The "War On Poverty"
With this unorthodox executive stamp of approval, the anti-
poverty program was begun. Early in his administration, Johnson
devoted much energy to make poverty an issue of public concern.
2 Doris Kearns, Lyndon B. Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harp'
& Row, 1976), p. 188.
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Within six months his ~fforts turned what had been largely the
concern of a small number of liberal intellectuals and government
bureaucrats into "the national disgrace that shattered the
complacency of a people who always considered their country a land
of equal opportunity for all. 1I3
Johnson's plan for political responsibility began with a shaping
of the political consensus beforehand. After elaborate courtship
with leaders of relevant interest groups, he confronted Congress in
his first State of the Union address to declare an "unconditional war
on poverty:"
This program is much more than a beginning. It is a total
commitment by this President and this Congress and this
nation to pursue victory over' the most ancient of mankind's
enemies... On similar occasions in the past we have often been
called upon to wage war against foreign enemies which
threaten our freedom today. Now we are asked to declare war
on a domestic enemy which threatens the strength of our
nation and the welfare of our people. If we now move forward
against this enemy - if we can bring to the challenges 0 f
peace the same determination and strength which has brought
us victory in war - then this day and this Congress will have
won a more secure and honorable place in the history of the
nation and the enduring gratitude of generations of Americans
to come.4
3 Kearns, p. 188.
4 Kearns, p. 189.
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As a result of Johnson's call to arms for the War on Poverty, on
August 20, 1964, the Economic Opportunity Act became law.
Johnson was eager to turn the War on Poverty into his version
of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. As the new president, Johnson
was looking for a program that would both establish the identity of
his own administration, beyond Kennedy's legacy and fulfill his
desire to leave a mark on history as a great reformer.s He saw the
plight of the poor as a perfect opportunity. No politician in his or
her right mind would rally against such a humanitarian goal as the
war against poverty. Unlike the New Deal which targeted vast
unemployment and a national emergency among blue- and white-
collar workers, it was the desperately poor that Johnson was
seeking to aid in his plan for a "Great Society." "They had no voice
and no champion," said Johnson and, "whatever the cost, I was
determined to represent them. Through me they would have an
advocate, and I believe, a new hope."6
A prosperous economy was crucial for Johnson's plan. "If
S John C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty (Washington, D.C.: University
Press of America, 1980), p. 17.
6 Lyndon 8. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency g
1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Wilson, 1971), p. 71.
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wages and profits increased most Americans would prosper, job
opportunities would expand sUfficiently to make room for
affirmative action for blacks without threatening the whites, and
higher federal revenues would finance Great Society programs
without additional taxes."7 The War on Poverty was meant to be for
those who could not help themselves without any guidance. It was
to offer a hand up through a vast range of programs covering areas
like aid to education, child health and nutrition, adult literacy, and
job training. Johnson carefully selected Sargent Shriver, the
successful founder of the Peace Corps, to head the newly founded
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).
Community Action Programs
The portion of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 that
addressed "citizen participation" and "community action"
specifically is only part of the legislation, but it is the area to be
concentrated on for the purpose of this paper. At the time, the
7 Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson: Thl
White House Years (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 75.
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community action concept did not raise much concern in the
Congressional hearings due to the fact that no one was sure what it
entailed.8 It did not appear to be a source of any great controversy.
The conclusion that it was mainly a device for coordinating
government services was widely interpreted from section 202(a) of
the legislation:
The term "community action program" means a program... (1)
which mobilizes and utilizes resources, public and private, of
any urban and rural. .. geographical area... in an attack on
poverty; (2) which provides services, assistance, and oth er
activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of
progress toward eliminating poverty or [the] causes of poverty
through developing employment opportunities, improving
human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering
the condition under which people live and work; (3) which is
developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum
feasible participation of residents of the areas and members
of the groups served; (4) which is conducted, administered, or
coordinated by a public or private non-profit agency. . . 9
After reading the above section significant features can be
identified. John Donovan (1980) translates the legal language as
follows: "Community was fervently anti-establishment; schools,
employment services, welfare agencies, city hall were all part of an
8 Donovan, p. 40.
9 U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Education and Labor. Econon
Opportunity Act of 1964 Report Number 1458 88th Congress, 2d Sess., 1964.
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'establishment' or 'system' which served the 'disadvantaged' (another
key concept) by referring them from one 'helping service' to another
without ever really understanding or challenging 'the culture of
poverty' and with no real ability to move families and individuals
out of poverty. "10
The OED was filled with idealists who saw the Community
Action Program (CAP) as the chance for much needed radical change.
Innocently enough, CAP started as an invitation to local communities
to form or revive community action agencies (CAA). "CAAs were
charged with mobilizing local resources for a comprehensive attack
on poverty, an attack that was to have three objectives to provide
new services to the poor; to coordinate all federal, state, and local
programs dealing with the poor; and to promote institutional change
in the interests of the poor."11 The CAP gave every indication of
being a very promising domestic program. Section 202(a) of the Act
provided "an opportunity for the American [poor] to transform his
image of himself by using federal funds and federal standards to
10 Donovan, p. 41.
11 Allen J. Matusow, The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in
the 1960s (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 244.
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demand that city hall and its bureaucracies provide services for him
and his family equal to those normally available for white middle-
class America."12
The third condition in the 202(a) section of the legislation for
CAP was specifically to combat the inevitable resistance by local
governments in "promoting institutional change." The "maximum
feasible participation" concept had three major strategies:
First, poor people might be directly represented on the
governing boards of the local CAAs, where they could plan and
oversee programs. Second, the poor might be employed as
"subprofessional" to help carry out programs in schools,
hospitals, and welfare agencies, acting as a bridge between
institutions and clients. And third, CAAs might hire workers
to organize the poor into groups capable - "of pressing their
needs upon the political officials and the bureaucracies of the
community."13
These strategies went beyond the planning stages and became
procedure. Local community action administrators were given
guidelines to follow in order to implement this level of
participation. They were told "to assist the poor in developing
autonomous and self-managed organizations which are competent to
12 Donovan, p. 47.
13 Matusow, p. 245.
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exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest."14
Planning, policy-making, as well as operation were all to
incorporate the poor into local action. They were to be a part of the
advisory organizations as elected representatives of the poor.
Through such plans, the federal government was facilitating and
financing the political organization of the poor into a viable
pressure group.
CAAs were to serve as a liaison between the federal
government and local communities. The federal funds for the
program went directly to the new community groups, without
involving the state or local governments. Because of their own
source of funding, these groups, in theory, did not have to be held
accountable to local authorities. They were not obligated to local
political purse strings. "Of all the community action funds spent by
the OEO by 1968, only 25 percent were given to public agencies at
all, the remainder going to private organizations."15 How the OED
spent the money was not so much the issue as who got to spend the
14 Dennis R. Judd, The Politics of American Cities (Illinois: Scott, Foresmc
and Co., 1988), p. 317.
15 Francis F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functh
of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1971), p. 295.
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money. Local authorities would have rather received the money,
retained their power, and delegated business as usual. The fact that
federal funds were given to "exert pressure on local bureaucracies,
to encourage them to innovate and challenge them to create new
institutions" 16 also was not very popular.
Protests of the Establishment
While some saw the increasing participation of the poor as the
beginning of much needed change, many more cried out against such
organizing efforts. Those who protested reasoned that the programs
would encourage attacks on established local institutions: city hall,
school boards, welfare agencies, and other governing offices. The
radical possibilities of community action did not become apparent to
members of Congress and local government officials until after the
anti-poverty legislation was passed. Contradictions rose out of the
desire to have CAPs seek reform from the same political system
with which it was trying to cooperate. "Naively, the planners hoped
for a creative synthesis in which the institutions would respond
16 Donovan, p. 41.
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positively to protest, and the protesting poor would accept the
necessity of compromise."17
With control of the purse strings and the legal requirement for
maximum feasible participation the OEO had two distinct advantages
in its pursuit of progress despite contrary sentiments from local
officials. Still, the opposition to the OEO programs was persistent
and the hostility was growing. The fact that federal monies were
bypassing local institutions to fund the very organizations that were
undermining the established authority was a source of much
controversy. "lf new representatives arise among the non-white
urban poor, they will 'Surely undermine the power of the men now
entrenched in city hall, whose power, especially since the nineteen-
thirties, has depended in no small measure on control of the 'welfare
industry' and the millions of federal dollars that flow through city
hall en route to the poor."18 In general, the local governments would
prefer to encourage the trend of federal anti-poverty money flowing
into their cities while discouraging any further federal intervention.
In June 1965, the United States Conference of Mayors reacted
17 Matusow, p. 245.
18 Donovan, p. 45.
43
to the obvious threat to their power. The mayors wanted a "non-
political" definition of maximum feasible participation. The original
OED definition posed too great a lien on the their power. "It cannot
be ignored that stimulating new flow channels for the demands of
the poor and minority groups is fraught with danger for any
mayor."19 They issued a referendum as to what they interpreted
maximum feasible participation to be: "... Now THEREFORE BE IT
RESOLVED that the Administration be urged to assure that any
policy... assure the continuing control of local expenditures relative
to this program be fiscally responsible to local officials."20 The
consensus of the mayors was dissatisfaction with CAP's intentions
to change institutions as a way of improving services. They claimed
that the poverty program was handing public administration powers
to people who do not understand the problems and operations of local
governments. The ultimate authority should remain with the local
governing bodies, not with unskilled radicals. Chaos was the
19 Paul E. Peterson, City Politics and Community Action (Chicago: Universi
of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 116.
20 J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the
War on Poverty," in City Politics and Public Policy (New York: John Wiley, 1968),
275.
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predicted result if the federal government did not listen to the
mayors.
In response, Sargent Shriver told a Congressional committee
that the OED's purpose was to "encourage at the local level the basic
democratic processes which have made this country great. .. and
that includes arguments, disputes, dissension, and what I like to call
'community action'... When we see disputes at the local level, then
we think we are getting exactly what Congress asked us to
encourage. "21 It was still early in the game for Shriver and the OED,
so they maintained the party line as long as they were permitted.
The OED produced its Community Action Program Guide and
Workbook as a guideline to prevent the local political institutions
from further interpreting what they thought the OED wanted. The
program was completely spelled out for the communities to follow.
Instead of using the mayors' version for participation of the people,
the Guide explicitly called for the inclusion of three groups on CAAs
boards - public and private institutions dealing with the poor;
community elements like churches, unions, and ethnic groups; and
21 William C. Selaner, "View from Capitol Hill: Harassment and Survival," a
quoted in On Fighting Poverty, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: John Wiley, 1968),
275.
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poor people themselves.22 It stressed the importance of empowering
the poor so that they could bring about changes in the system.
Community organizing was proposed in the Workbook to empower
the poor through the use of trained workers to help the poor form
autonomous and self-managed organizations which are competent to
exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest. For
many of the same reasons supporting citizen participation (listed in
Chapter One), these community organizations were the newest
weapon in the War on Poverty.
The opposition from the coalition of mayors persisted. Even
Democratic mayors were attacking the Administration. Again they
demanded local CAPs be controlled by local authorities and that the
federal government should not be instigating a "class struggle."23
The mayors bypassed Shriver and directed their grievances through
Vice President Hubert Humphrey.24 He was told that the OEO seemed
to be operating on the theory that existing institutions were not the
most effective means of promoting change for the poor. They
22 OEO, Community Action Program Guide (Feb. 1965), p. 17.
23 Matusow, p. 250.
24 Donovan, p. 57.
46
charged the OED with II 'undermining the integrity of local
government' by organizing the poor into militant, politically active
groups.1I25 The local governments were not going to allow these
circumstances to continue. They demanded that lithe sovereign part
of each locality... should have the power of approval over the
makeup of the planning group, over the structure of the planning
group, over the plan."26
Advisors to the President came to a concurring conclusion.
Specifically, it was determined that lithe OED had got off on the
wrong foot by 'organizing the poor politically' and arousing fears
among the mayors that it was 'setting up competing political
organizations in their own backyards.' The OED should be told to
'soft pedal its conflicts with local officials over heavy
representation of the poor on the poverty planning boards.' "27 As a
political bureaucrat, President Johnson did not foresee the potential
impact and controversy that would arise out of the legislation.
25 Donovan, p. 55.
26 Donovan, p. 55.
27 Memo to President, September 18, 1965, (OED File) Bill Moyer's office, c
quoted in Matusow, p. 250.
47
Johnson, who had at first thrown all his political weight behind this
program, but now was suffering in public opinion polls because of
the "conflict" in Vietnam, agreed with his advisers. The power of
the OEO never would recover from losing the favor of the President.
Conclusion
The important aspect of the OEO affair to recognize is the fact
that the poor never fully played the influential role that was
intended for them. This can be attributed to the eternally unequal
political machines involved and the stubborn reluctance of local
institutions to comply.
Having the poor represented on the CAA boards had given the
appearance of an advantage for the poor populace. Gradually, the
"sense that [the poor had] been victorious on the wrong battlefield,
or at least on a relatively non-strategic one" was becoming
apparent. 28 Two factors contributed to this sentiment. One was the
28 Donovan, p. 44.
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fact that the poor were not taken very seriously on CAA boards.29
"The voice of the poor on the boards was typically drowned out by
the articulate professionals and politicians while real power
belonged mainly to executive committees, which contained poor
people."30 The second factor was that the few poor that managed to
be members of CAA boards were put there because they were
considered to be not as threatening to the status quo. Lillian Rubin
(1969) characterizes "threatening" participants as "hard core" and
who might pursue institutional changes too fervently.31 The
representatives of the poor on the board tended to be of an "upwardly
mobile" status. As a result they tended to have personal plans for
advancement and little concern for the poor communities from which
they originated. Their concentration on self-centered motives,
rather than community-centered motives, defeated the very reason
for their presence on the boards.
29 Kenneth B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty
(New York: Pantheon, 1969), preface, iv.
30 Matusow, p. 251.
31 Lillian B. Rubin, "Maximum Feasible Participation: The Origins,
Implications, and Present Status," The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science (vol. 385, Sept. 1969), p. 22.
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In Philadelphia, Mayor James Tate was forced by the OEO to
reorganize his CAA, which had become a source of political
patronage, to properly incorporate representatives of the poor on the
board. Instead, Tate appointed a powerful and wealthy black named
Samuel L. Evans as vice-chairman to the board. Evans actions on the
CAA board were dedicated to the purpose of excluding the poor and
any influence they might have had.
There was no community organizing, either to bring the
disaffiliated in touch with service programs or to mobilize the
poor for political action. Institutional reform attributable to
community action in Philadelphia was nonexistent. In the
spring of 1967 an OEO investigation found that Evans had
discredited community action with every responsible agency
and group in the city and has hurt OEO's image nationally.'32
Funds were eventually suspended to CAP in Philadelphia, as a result.
The designs of the anti-poverty programs for citizen
participation, like CAPs and CAAs, were considered by critics as the
most remitting forms and, as a result, not very effective ones. The
programs were determined to be "the most easily controlled and
symbolically satisfying methods of 'participation) available."33 Most
programs did not empower the poor, instead merely provided
32 Matusow, p. 257.
33 Judd, p. 321.
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traditional services through established institutions. Within only
three of the twenty cities studied by the OEO did the CAAs actually
mobilize the poor for, political action. 34 As should have been
expected, the abated forms of participation began to succumb to
political pressures generated by local governments, rendering them
even more ineffective.
Political pressures retarded any chances of CAP being
successful. The plan, in the beginning, was to fund a select number
of communities in the pursuit against poverty. It was thought that
focusing funding on key areas bettered the chances of success. The
desire to exert maximum impact by concentrating the available
money in specific areas was overridden by the OEO's need to
consolidate congressional support. The spreading of money around to
additional districts was done to gain the additional needed support
from the areas' representatives. The "spreading" pushed the original
proposed number of community projects from 650 in the first year
to 1,100 by 1967.35 Any imp~ct-,---Cls a resul~, would.:~be minimal
because the concentration of funds was watered-down by the
34 Matusow, p. 267.
35 Judd, p. 319.
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creation of all the new projects.
The people of power in the political system, those that
represented interests in maintaining existing political structures,
Le. middle-to-upper class voters, business leaders, and career
politicians, managed to exert considerable influence within the
federal government. This powerful part of the population had no
motivation or reason to risk everything in pursuit of equal
representation for the poor. Public and private bureaucracies were
primarily interested in maintaining control of funds and programs.
There was a general resistance toward the concept of mobilizing the
poor, to say the least. It was seen as a waste of time, effort, and
money.
An example of community action falling to the mercy of local
elites is the fate of CAP in Atlanta, Georgia:
The white businessmen who ruled the city were quite
willing to tolerate community action, provided it did not rile
the placid waters of civic life. To make sure that it did not,
Boisfeuillet "Bo" Jones was made chairman of Economic
Opportunity, Atlanta. - His board contained no_p-o_oJ_p_eople;-an _
advisory committee recruited from the target neighborhoods
had no function; and the community organizers attached to
the neighborhood service centers were diverted from
organizing to rendering short-term services for individual poor
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people.36
When Atlanta was reviewed by the OEO it was found to "have
developed into a large, cumbersome bureaucracy whose major
achievement to date appears to have been the attraction of federal
money into the city."37 Despite such blatant misrepresentation of
CAP's purpose, funding to Atlanta was not cut off.
As the opposition grew against the OEO, the resulting
alterations further limited its power. One of the more crucial blows
came to the agency when Congress passed a resolution that gave the
option to local governments to take over and operate CAAs whenever
they saw fit.38 This resulted in the CAAs serving as mere
dispensers of services, just like all the other social service
agencies before them. No longer could they consider the element of
change as a plan or possibility. Now they only served and thus did
not threaten local authority. The complete change in the purpose
for the OED was made very clear when its former opposition, the
_________ coalition of mayors, issued a favorable review. It praised the OEO as
36 Matusow, p. 255.
37 Matusow, p. 255.
- ----y:?
38 The New York Times, November 8, 1967, A20.
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a "positive force in lessening social tensions. II In other words, the
OEO was to be congratulated for falling in with the status quo.
The OEO was eventually abolished (in 1974) after being
gradually stripped of what little power it retained. What had
initially been created as the President's pet project was all but
ignored in the end by Johnson. His attentions were concentrated on
the crisis in Vietnam. Johnson, also, was wary of any more
controversy (i.e., riots) that might be created by the OEO. The
purpose of the War on Poverty was to serve as a safe domestic
policy in that it was to reflect well upon the President. Instead, as
criticisms from local and state governments grew to frantic levels,
the negative effects on the Johnson's image and standing with the
public greatly outweighed any real benefits that were yet to be seen.
Kenneth Clark (1969) sums up the reasons for all the failures
of the OEO in one statement. liThe paradox of the community action
programs is this: the programs need, and have received, support
from the government, i.e. established order; yet their very
effectiveness depends on challenging the same order and
transforming society itself."39 A national program which uses
39 Clark, p. 159.
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federal funds in challenging the established order and in
transforming society ranks renders itself ineffective.
Clark writes of the failures of the OEO from first hand
experience. Clark designed and implemented a delinquency program
in Harlem, Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited (HARYOU), that was
t
dedicated to "not only - more youth services, but for neighborhood
boards that would empower the poor to deal with their own problems
and press for institutional change."40 Local political pressures took
over the organization from Clark in order to serve their own
purposes. The results were extensive mismanagement of funds and
ineffective policy which eventually led to $20 Million disappearing
"without a trace" and the furthering of social unrest in Harlem.41
Using the War on Poverty as the example; what started out as
a concerted mechanism for change, resulted in just another social
service agency, after political pressures drastically altered its
course. The OEO was a "charade, an exhilarating intellectual game
whose players never understood the nature of power and the
40 Matusow, p. 257.
41 Matusow, p. 258-60.
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reluctance of those who have it to share it."42 Judd identifies the
problem as a typical one of bureaucracy. "The [anti-poverty]
legislation was drafted entirely by bureaucrats within the executive
branch. Representatives of poverty communities were absent from
the hearings in Congress, and during implementation of the program
they were excluded from contributing an important voice in the
national anti-poverty effort. "43
The OEO struck upon an effective source of change through its
,
proposition for community organizations. The creation of an
"autonomous and self-managed organization which is competent to
exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest" is the
mode to pursue for meaningful citizen participation. But such a
mode will always be subject to lethal political pressures when it is
created by the government.
As soon as citizen participation began to create a voice for the
poor in Syracuse, New York, the OEO opted to pull the funding.
"Organizers were forming tenant unions in public housing projects,
spending public money to bailout protesting welfare mothers, and
42 Clark, preface,vi.
43 Judd, p. 319.
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conducting a voters-registration drive whose purpose could only be
to defeat Republican Mayor William Walsh in the city's upcoming
election."44 Shriver retreated from the controversy raised by Walsh
and other mayors by canceling the program in Syracuse. The liberal
flaw of CAP makes the creation of community organization under the
federal government futile.
The conclusion to not involve the federal government in the
process of community organizing is not made with the purpose of
excusing it from responsibility within these communities. There
still remain areas of extensive neglect that are well within the
federal government's capacity to act upon, such as reforms in the
education system and escalation of the war on drugs. In addition,
the government should be expected to work with a community
organization once it has become established on its own, as described
in the following chapter.
44 Matusow, p. 248.
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Chapter 3
Community Organizations
There is nothing in our past or present experience which
suggests that we outsiders can effectively organize . . . a community
to which we do not now and have never belonged. And should a time
ever come when it is possible to effect such an organization, then
the character of American life will have so radically changed as to
have ceased to be American. In a large measure it will have become
totalitarian.
To be sure, we have established and we can continue to
establish in the underprivileged community . . . We can also establish
these agencies in haphazard and competitive fashion, as we have
often done in the past, or we can plan for their effective utilization
with as much intelligence as possible through some sort of
procedure or co-ordination as we have done on occasions more
recently. But, whether the agencies are established or not
established, and whether they compete with each other or are co-
ordinated, the fact remains that the community is not being really
organized either by us or by the people living within its confines.
Essentially what we are doing is to decide what is good for the
underprivileged area without any real participation by, or even
sustained consultation with, the people of that area; we are trying
to do something to rather than with it. In the last analysis, our
approach is fundamentally authoritarian, fundamentally
undemocratic.
Gardner Howland Shaw. Fighting Delinquency from Within.
(New-YurK:-Wglfarn--euuncil-m-Nawl'ork, 1944-)-.-------
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Introduction
The previous chapter gave an example of an attempt by the
federal government to induce a form of citizen participation. Out of
the failed attempts by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) to
combat poverty rose a practical mode of change. The concept of
community organization, while not a new idea, was put to the test
by the OEO in cities across America. For the reasons stated in the
previous chapter Community Action Programs (CAP) were not very
successful. The purpose of this chapter is to explore, as an
alternative, the concept of citizen participation through community
organizations that are generated from the non-public sector. The
distinction will be made between an organization created within a
community and one generated through a bureaucracy. Tom Hayden
-------- ._----_._------
(1988) equates the difference between the two as being like "the
difference between a supportive community and a bureaucracy,
between participatory democracy and administrative management,
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between power for poor people and services for poor clients." 1
Upon making this distinction, various forms of community
organizations will be explored briefly in order to introduce the final
model as the most effective. The process of this model, Saul
Alinsky's creation, will be thoroughly described
A Need for Specialization
It has been established that when people are effectively cut
off from conventional participation within a community a feeling of
powerlessness is created. Participation in politics at the
community level is strongly influenced by a citizen's attitudes
towards the local community. The notion that local governments do
not care about the inherent concerns of ghetto life creates the
desire for local control. Concerns like high crime, poor schools, and
unhealthy living conditions are potential reasons for taking matters
into ones own hands. "Presumably the arrangement and intensity of
-- ----
1 Tom Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 145.
146.
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a person's political attitudes help structure his political behavior." 2
In pursuit of effectiveness, the desire for local control is
coupled with a basic belief in the democratic system. There must be
some form of confidence in the capacity of the government to bring
about desirable change. If a citizen has no reason to believe that the
system can positively effect his or her life, there is less reason to
participate. This lack of confidence may be compounded by the fact
that low-income people have little to offer in the form of material
inducements and social location, thereby, in their eyes, cutting them
off from existing political systems.
Disaffection with the government is a rational response to
severe environmental deprivations. However, it is this disaffection
that can be used to benefit the situation. Frances Piven (1966)
wrote; "Strategies to obtain participation of residents must
overcome the general lack of resources in low-income communities:
scarce knowledge, apathetic beliefs, and few inducements by which
to hold leadership or build organizations." 3 From disaffection a
2 Bailey, p. 37.
3 Frances F. Piven, "Participation of Residents in Neighborhood Community
Action Programs," Social Work, II (1), January 1966.
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citizen can draw the desire and motivation to bring about change.
Embodiment of citizen participation is found to be most
successful through a movement of progressive organization. This
movement's success is based on the extent to which it challenges
the existing arrangement of social, political, and economic order.
Challenges and solutions are drawn from the particular concerns of
each community so as not to be accused of being the same old
ineffective social movement. The methodology that "one size fits
all" for social policies is inaccurate and ineffective. "Traditions of
local autonomy that shape the consciousness of people are the
sources of democratic change and need only be freed, enhanced, and
supported, not transformed." 4 Community organizations are or
should be based on the goals of the local citizens. It is this element
of specialization that focuses a group and often brings about
success.
George Rude (1980) identifies the importance of specialization
for effective intervention into a community. Rude refers to the
\
4 Robert Fisher and Joseph M. Kling, "Leading the People: Two Approaches tl
the Role of Ideology in Community Organizing," Dilemmas of Activism: Class,
Community, and the Politics of Local Mobilization Eds. Joseph M. Kling and
Prudence S. Posner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 72.
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"inherent" ideology as being "based on direct experience, oral
traditiop, or folk-memory and not learned by listening to sermons or
speeches" and may, in fact, be identified with "the culture of people
at large. "5 This ideology is drawn from the lower classes' sense of
rights and traditions. Ideology in this case is defined as the
"articulated set of ideals, ends, and purposes which help the
members of [a] system interpret the past, explain the present, and
offer a vision of the future."6 Rude reasons that when faced with
challenges, exploited groups will organize and rise up in defense of
what they identify as their inherited rights and ideologies.
Regardless of how blighted or depressed a community may be, there
still is an inherent ideology that that will eventually be awakened,
usually when a crisis arises. "Unless a derived ideology is at work
somewhere in the mix of beliefs that forms a consciousness of
vulnerable classes, popular organizations will not move beyond
existing social and political parameters." 7 Working with community
5 George Rude, Ideology and Popular Protest (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p.
28+29.
6 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley Pres
1967), p. 45.
7 Fisher, p.74.
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organizations, citizens can move beyond being on the defense to
progressive pursuits.
Purposes for Community Organizations
A progressive strategy exists within the models for
community organizations. Turning existing feelings of
powerlessness into citizen action is the ultimate goal for these
organizations. The groups "may be viewed as a formal voluntary
,j,
association' est,ablished to obtain political and social goals by
mobilizing a constituency from among people sharing a physical
community and presumed to share common interests."8 It is through
an o'rganization that the pooled efforts of concerned individuals
should originate. An independent effort by "suppressed" persons may
not develop sufficient political response, and thus deepen the
feeling of powerlessness. The influence of individuals is mediated
and empowered by organizations.
Community organizations are to serve as a sounding board for
residents who are unwilling or unable to go through established
8 Bailey, p. 43.
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political channels. This function includes the compilation of the
issues at hand. Problems within a community do not have to be
brought to the attention of its residents. They are all too aware of
existing conditions, good and bad. Residents may differ, though on
the sources of their problems, whether they be slumlords, hustlers,
drug dealers, petty bureaucrats and/or politicians. However, one of
the purposes of a community organization is to formulate the issues
and place these problems within a larger framework of meaning. In
summarizing the redefinition of concerns in Chicago's Woodlawn
Organization, John Fish wrote:
Most people - have an "interest"in slum housing, poverty,
unemployment, poor schools, inadequate medical facilities in
the sense that they are affected by these social problems and
have an attitude toward them. But these problems are not
issues until the interests are lifted up by a group which
interprets them, places them in a more comprehensive
framework, furnishes them with tactics in order that they
might be pursued to a successful outcome, and hence, presses
them onto the public agenda. Community organization is in a
sense, an attempt to convert interests into politically relevant
issues.9
After specification of the community's needs, the organization must
articulate them. This would involve the processing of demands
9 John H. Fish, Black Power/White Control: The Struggle of the Woodlawn
Organization in Chicago (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 106.
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within their local political system through protest.
Drawn from the desire for local control, the primary concern
for the citizens is the readjustment of power relations, at least to
the extent that citizen involvement in decision making becomes
more democratic and effective. A source of power and a formalized
mechanism for communicating needs to decision-makers is created
through community organizations. Three basic objectives were
listed in Piven's study of early citizen participation models. They
are as follows:
1. Fostering the participation of low-income people in a
variety of local associations.
2. Enhancing the effective influence of low-income people on
the policies and practices of institutions that serve the low-
income community.
3. Establishing the conditions for effective individual and
family life by altering the social context of individual
behavior. 10
The context in which these goals take shape depends on the type of
community organization involved. From the non-governmental
sector, a variety of organizational forms have evolved for the
purpose of citizen participation. Within this chapter, the seven
basic kinds of organizations will be reviewed. "The formal structure
10 Piven, p. 116.
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!of an organization represents the considered intentions of its
creators to develop a system of rules defining the tasks to be
performed, the decision-making process, the lines of communication
and control, and the rights and responsibilities of the participants."
11 For the purpose of effective participation that covers a
community and all its diversities, one form in particular stands out
above the others; the Alinsky model. This is not to detract from the
importance of the other models, for each has a crucial role in its
own right. Depending on the nature of the goal, one organization may
be better suited than the other. The basis of the Alinsky approach is
the incorporation of as many other organizations within the
community as possible in order to gain a diversity of inputs and
energies.
Types of Community Organizations
Long before citizen action programs made their debut on the
public agenda, civic improvement associations were in existence.
11Joan E. Lancourt, Confront or Concede (Washington; D.C.: Lexington Books,
1979), p. 109.
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This form of community organization pursues a multitude of goals.
Common examples of such associations are historical preservation
societies. Within these societies there is generally greater concern
for rehabilitation of landmarks than there is for peoples' lives. They
rarely involve protest and are privately funded. Agendas are based
on long-term plans and exist for many years. In general, the
associations are composed of middle-to-upper class citizens who
wish to give something back to their community. While they rarely
serve any great political purpose, civic improvement associations do
benefit their societies through participation. It is not
characteristic of these organizations to delve into the social issues,
like unemployment and poverty.
The creation of ad hoc organizations is often in response to
specific social problems. These groups are characterized by a
"temporary convergence on a common policy of different leaders
drawn from a number of different centers of influence." 12 Coalitions
of this type are not long term commitments and are most effective
,
when their goals can be reached in a short period of time. As soon
12 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 198.
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as the issue at hand is resolved, the group often disbands. One view
as to the reason for their short term existence is that the coalitions
"usually lack the formalization needed to sustain a group over a long
time interval. "13
Ad hoc groups are similar to some grass roots movements with
their informal structure and temporary status. Robert Dahl (1961)
reasoned from his study of New Haven that participants in this style
of organization "become active politically not from a sense of duty
nor out of sustained interest in politics, but because primary goals
at the focus of their lives were endangered and political action was
thought to be the only way to ward off danger."14 Dahl also claims
that such groups are incapable of gaining crucial access to key
public officials or "providing centralized deliberate coordination
over a wide range of city activities."15 Considering these
shortcomings, combined with the difficulty of obtaining necessary
funds and information, ad hoc groups are often limited in
effectiveness.
13 Bailey, p. 45.
14 Dahl, p. 197.
15 Dahl, p. 199.
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Another form of community action is through the local
chapters of national organizations. These organizations are found to
be effective, but limited in range due to their commitment to co-
ordinate a community around a single issue. There is no regular
staff on duty at all times for the local chapters. They are organized
on a long-term basis to confront issues like welfare or housing and
have private sources of funding via membership dues. In the case of
the National Tenants Organization, the local chapters act on behalf
of low-income tenants. Its purpose is the organizing of tenants that
.1-
desire gr~ater control over housing concerns like maintenance,
operating rules, and selection of new tenants.16 The type of
community organization has no ambition to go beyond its set
limitations. Its fundamental goal is to concentrate on its defined
single function.
With racially based organizations, while they effectively
promote citizen participation, the purpose of the coalition is
difficult to judge, especially in comparison to a group based on
locality. Yet, "some racial or civil rights organizations differ from
16 , "Now Its Rent Strikes," U.S. News and World Report, October
20, 1969, p.31.
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community organizations only in so far as a residential area is not
the primary basis for organizing."17 Afro-American organizations,
in addition to crossing neighborhoods, cross socio-economic status.
Because Afro-Americans are members of a long-suppressed
minority, attitudes of dissatisfaction, distrust, and powerlessness
are characteristic of them regardless of their socioeconomic status
and subsequent patterns of political participation.
Despite any greater justification, critics find race to be an
essentially divisive base on which to build a community
organization. Robert Bailey, Jr. (1974) reports that "the
identification of the movement for community control with black
power delegitimizes that movement among white people, rather than
providing a common bond for equally powerless black and white
communities." 18 Conflict as a result of racially-based
organizations can detract from any greater goals to be achieved. The
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
is a very successful and respected example of a racially-based
organization. Although technically the NAACP is based on a legal
17 Bailey, p. 47.
18 Ira Katznelson, City Trenches (New York: Pantheon, 1981), p. 273.
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orientation, when held in comparison with the other organizations at
the community level, it would roughly fall under the category of a
national organization because it works through local chapters. The
argument must be made, in response to Bailey's opinion, that when a
community cannot function with the existence of any peaceful form
of organization based on race, there is little hope for it to come
together to heal any other social ills.
Storefront organizations are the coalition of civic-minded
people that come into a community to give aid. They are "creatively
organized - as an agency of defense for the impoverished individual
who is daily victimized by traditional community agencies." 19 This
form of organization has a, paid full time staff with a private source
of funding (often from churches). After the establishment of the
organization, the people of the community are expected to come
there for assistance. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
used the storefront model in their attempt at organizing the lower
classes.
The Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) was formed
19 William W. Ellis, White Ethics and Black Power: The Emergence of the vv
Side Organization (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 70.
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by the SOS as their interpretation of a community organization.
While the project was abandoned long ago, it is a useful example of
storefront organizations and their shortcomings. The national
organization of SOS sponsored a number of community projects at
the local level for the assistance of the poor and to further the SOS
ideology. Their "goals were to develop community control and
economic reforms among whites in northern cities, linking these
efforts to the black southern civil rights movement. II 20 An
integrated grass roots movement of the poor would be the end result.
A vision of economic justice was the inspiration to build a sense of
trust and support so that the ERAP could help the underprivileged
overcome poverty and political voicelessness.
SOS viewed their first step as establishing a presence in the
community and gaining acceptance. This proved to be a very long and
slow process with the methods employed by the ERAP. A storefront
operation was to serve as a place where citizens of the community
would feel comfortable and where they could bring their concerns
and problems. Staffing these storefronts were students. This
20 Wini Breiner, Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968:
The Great Refusal *New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1982), p. 126.
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created the first of this model's flaws. An impossible task was
created; "full-time off-campus work could not be undertaken by
people who were students and whose home was campus. "21 The
ERAP also failed to gain any power for the communities they were
trying to help. "ERAP's difficulty lay with the phenomenon of self-
blame in our culture, which organizers began to understand; the
resistance to thinking politically was monumental." 22 As the size
and difficulty of the tasks that they had laid in front of them began
to become more apparent, the SDS succumbed to their own
limitations and cancelled ERAP.
The Alinsky Model
The limitations of the above-mentioned organizational
structures can be minimized and their benefits can be incorporated
under the umbrella organization in the Alinsky model. To properly
introduce this approach, it is necessary to briefly introduce its
founder and two model examples of his organization. Saul Alinsky
21 Breiner, p. 127.
22 Breiner, p. 148.
74
(1909 - 1972) was the father of modern community organizing. Long
before "maximum feasible participation" was penned, Alinsky was
attempting to organize the poor into a political force. His method,
often labeled as the "backyard revolution," was based on the
community as the locus of organizing. In accordance with the ideal
characteristics of citizen participation, Alinsky created the process
with tactical emphasis on community values and traditions. "Only
community organization grounded in people's traditions," Alinsky
thought, was "truly representative of the people and truly in keeping
with the spirit of democracy." An actual democracy included the
incorporation of all facets of a community's structure:
A People's Organization actually is built upon all of the
diverse loyalties - to the church, to labor union, to the social
groups, to the nationality groups, to the myriad other groups
and institutions which compromise the constellation of the
American way of life. These loyalties combine to effect an
abiding faith in, and a profound loyalty to, the democratic way
of life. 23
The supplying of power and dignity to a community encourages them
to argue on their own behalf and conduct their own organizations.
Two such organizations, both based in the Chicago area, are the
23 Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres~
1946), p. 88.
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Woodlawn Organization (TWO) and the Organization for a Better
Austin (OSA). Woodlawn and Austin were both depressed inner-city
neighborhoods in desperate need of reform. TWO was formed in
protest against the University of Chicago's expansion plans which
threatened to displace citizens that had no where else to go. OBA
was created out of a general desire for change in their community.
TWO eventually expanded its agenda to include issues of change in
other social capacities, as well. Despite the similarities between
the two organizations, the reason they are both used is because of
their slightly different social compositions. Woodlawn is
predominantly lower-class minorities, while Austin has a population
of middle class whites integrated into the typical slum community.
The two make for an interesting sampling of successful community
organization and will serve as model examples of the Alinsky
approach. Throughout the chapter references will be made back to
one or both of the organizations.
The formation of Alinsky organizations are started by paid
organizers. These organizers never enter a community without being
invited. In the case of Woodlawn, a coalition of church officials
called for assistance from Alinsky. The extending of an invitation
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guarantees the organization an instant contact within the
community, as well as a source of funding (For TWO the funding
initially came from the churches.). Once there, the organizer
pursues the organization of the community's residents against any
economic or social problems. This may be compared to the
collective union organizing tactics used by labor forces.
Pursuit of organization may require the reordering of the
citizens' energies. To establish an Alinsky organization it is
imperative to have commitment from the citizens involved. The goal
is for a large organization to function as an "umbrella" and
encompasses other groups from within the community. The process
involves delegates from the other groups working within the
umbrella organization as representatives at the Congresses. An
example of an established organization of this type is the United
Way. The distinction must be made that the United Way is a
coalition of organizations contributing money to charities, while
Alinsky's umbrella organizations contribute ideas and action for
reform. Often citizens are members of a number of the smaller
groups involved, like their church, as well as the PTA. "Overlapping
membership almost precludes the possibility of conflict among the
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formal units that compose an organization. 1I 24 A fundamental rule
to this model is the admittance of any group of community members
who wish to organize and participate. The University of Chicago
eventually joined ranks with TWO in a transition from initial
antagonisms to cooperation. The university went beyond mere
IIverbal support for the organization by lobbying for TWO programs in
Washington. 1I25
Considering the different compositions of groups involved, the
overall membership of the large organization fluctuates. This is
attributed to either the changing interests in the community or
disbanding groups that are single-problem oriented after the
problem is resolved, like the previously-mentioned ad hoc groups.
The 1969 OBA Congress had a group called the Chateau Royal
Committee'whose goal was to force a large banquet hall, the Chateau
Royal, to construct more off street parking for its patrons. The
group achieved its purpose and then discontinued operation before
the 1970 Congress. 1I26 As long as an active core was maintained, and
24 Bailey, p. 51.
25 Lancourt, p. 60.
26 Bailey, p. 51.
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the number of organizations remained reasonably constant, turnover
was not perceived as a threat.
The most popular form of member organization is the block
group. This grass roots coalition is based on a neighborhood or
distinct area of the community. Due to its membership being within
close proximity of each other, the block group lends the organization
stability and an excellent communication network. The clubs are
formed as a defense mechanism by residents to prevent further
breakdown of their neighborhood. The clubs serve to mobilize
neighborhood opinion for the purpose of social control, such as crime
watches, and to apply pressure on public officials through its
association within the umbrella organization. Issues of relevancy to
block groups are those that have potential impact on the quality of
neighborhood life, such as drugs, garbage pick-up, street cleaning,
truancy enforcement, and the dog catcher.
Through studying the characteristics of participants in OBA
and TWO, it was discovered that the citizen-activist who gets
involved with a block club, as well as the larger organization is
driven by a strong commitment to actualize the diverse set of
community values. Without the effective community tie, there is
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little reason for involvement. Beside being more dissatisfied than
other residents, an activist wants to actively pursue the necessary
social change. Whether it be the desire to rid the streets of drug
dealers or to get regular trash pick up service, the actualization of
some expectation for their community is the driving force.
Activists are willing, and often prefer protest tactics, because they
feel the system is unresponsive to conventional approaches.
"Activists have a belief in participatory democracy expressed
through their desire to see the locus of authority for most decisions
rest with the people instead of government officials."27 Working
within the political system, their protests are peaceful efforts with
strong commitment to "constitutionally defined civil liberties" in
order to implement social change. Within the OBA conflict was
viewed as a constructive process that enabled movement toward
their goals. Participants in the OBA learned that they did not "have
to accept authority unquestioningly but they [could] successfully
challenge government officials."28
While the existence of activists is necessary to have a
27 Bailey, p. 107.
28 Bailey, p. 143.
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movement, the crucial element to the organization is native
leadership. Alinsky urged that "the building of a People's
organization can be done only by the people themselves." 29 Most
failed community organizations are due to the lack of inclusion of
indigenous leadership. Leaders within the community are the people
that the citizens look to for direction. A current example of such
leadership would be that of Reverend AI Sharpton. Despite his
distasteful and often destructive use of anti-white expletives,
Sharpton remains a strong motivating force for his community. The
importance of native leadership cannot be overemphasized. In order
to get to the people of the community, one must go through their own
leaders.
Richard Harris moved into South Austin and immediately
started organizing a network of block clubs. Residents sought
Harris's counsel on problems ranging from arguments with
spouses to where to find a job. The organizers heard of Harris
and his Washington Boulevard Council. They sought him out and
asked him to affiliate with theOBA.30
For the organizer, the identification of the community's leaders is
the most difficult and crucial element to the set-up process.
29 Alinsky, p. 87.
30 Bailey, p. 73.
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The Alinsky approach is dependent on a competent organizer.
It is the organizer who must come into a community and motivate a
populace to pull together for the purpose of change. Alinsky was
very specific as to the organizer's role. "He can serve as a stimulus,
a catalytic agent, and render invaluable service in the initial stages
of organization. He can lead in the laying down of the foundations -
but only the people and their own leaders can build a people's
organization." 31 The organizer must make sense of all the existing
problems that are circulating throughout the community without
direction or solution without imposing outside values over the
results.
In the initial stages of formation, an organizer must identify a
problem that will pull the people into a meeting. This draw is
sometimes called a "gimmick." Woodlawn had the threat of losing
their homes to bring the people to action, while OBA appealed for
peaceful integration of their community. Unless the people are
concerned by the problem in question, there will be no motivation to
take the first step. The organizer cannot assume any problem is
generally recognized. At the meetings, the organizer does not chair
31 Alinsky, p. 97.
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the progress. It is now time for the local leaders and activists to
take over. The native leaders are the. best sources for finding
problems drawing the most concern. "A potential issue can be
brought to the attention of the organizers and activists but it will
not be acted on unless at least several community members, a few
activists, and an organizer approve it. 1I32 Such a procedure keeps the
method in check. Within the OBA, whr-~n a majority does not see a
,"O, '
,-J
proposed issue as a problem, then it is not a problem that will be
pursued.
One of the fundamental distinctions between this form of
organizing and the methods used by the OEO is the source of funding.
By initially only relying on small donations, Alinsky's model
alleviates the pressure of outside influences during the formation
of the organization. Financial support comes from contributors and
benefits. The contributors can include small businesses,
individuals, local churches, other community groups (block clubs)
and organizations (United Way). The nature of the organization
places a great deal of stress on potential and existing sources of
funding. The organization may jeopardize their funding if they aim
32 Bailey, p. 75.
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protests at contributing groups, but if they fail to attack such
groups, they are failing to deal with the problems which they are
committed to solving.
Hector Coates, president of Coates-Miller Realty, once
made a small contribution to the OBA. Shortly afterward,
member organizations began to complain that Coates-Miller
was operating slum buildings. In an effort to get the buildings
repaired, the organization exerted intense pressure on
Coates.33
Their maintenance of an autonomous financial base is of paramount
importance. Without it, the community organizations would be no
more effective than OEO-funded programs.
Once an organization is established and is on stable ideological
footing, it is possible to "selectively partake of both the financial
and programmatic resources available through government channels."
34 This can be done without the "strings" associated with
government funding, as long as the programs in question are in
accordance with the organization's set agenda. The solution to
balancing organizational purpose with the. need for funding is the
selective combination of sources, rather than accepting one method
33 Bailey, p. 69.
34 Lancourt, p. 125.
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to the exclusion of another. While any source should be considered a
potential contributor, ultimately the organization's goals should not
be subject to compromise. "TWO's strategy for the development of
the Woodlawn Experimental School Project (WESP) demonstrated
that although contest activity was held in abeyance during the
developmental and negotiating stages of WESP, once the project was
under way, the organization immediately resumed its use of
confrontation tactics whenever it deemed it to be necessary ."3 5
Conclusion
The Alinsky approach exposes its weaknesses to be critiqued,
but remains to be a pragmatie solution to our inner-cities in crisis
today. The appeal of the model is the fact that the only way to truly
test its effectiveness is through implementation, as is the case in
Woodlawn and Austin. It is not a cookie cutter model that the
communities must be made to fit, in order to function. Community
organizations of the Alinsky style are made to the specifications of
the locality and its citizenry. The fundamentals are spelled out for
35 Lancourt, p. 129.
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guidelines. What a community puts into the organization is exactly
what they will get out of it. Alinsky-styled organizations still
remain from the early 1960s and new sources can be found today.
An example of a community in the process of organizing is
occurring in Dubuque, Iowa. A recent article in Newsweek wrote of a
crisis in Dubuque. Three years ago, in response to this small city
becoming multi-ethnic, two teenagers burned a black family's
garage. Other destructive acts were performed in this time period,
such as the burning of crosses and painting KKK slogans in public
places. Dubuque residents reacted by demanding that their area
should be rid of racism. A social experiment began along the
procedural lines of a community organization. The article labels the
movement as Dubuque's noble experiment."
Citizens of the city are demanding that the issue be settled
among themselves, with an emphasis on "fewer words, more deeds."
The Council for Diversity was created in response to the citizens
demands. An executive director was brought in from California,
chosen for her expertise in the field of integration. Her job was to
"help a city change." Since then programs have been created that are
answering "the need for minority employment, open housing, and
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educational programs to inoculate the young against bigotry."36 The
community has been awakened and the healing process has begun.
The continuity and effectiveness of such a program is not
guaranteed in Dubuque or anywhere else, but the effort has to be
made. Not all battles will be successful. The important feature that
will result from an approach like Alinsky's is an attempt at the
community drawing together as a power with which to be reckoned.
An example of a successfully established and operational community
organization is a family crisis clinic in Massachusetts.
Growing out of the need to help the many families in crisis,
the Family Center in Somerville, Massachusetts is a community
organization that concentrates on building strengths within a family
rather than on society's perceptions of its members' problems. The
Family Center helps families (300 to date) and the individuals
within families to manage and solve problems, while often
supporting families to deal with social and economic situations,
such as drugs, teen pregnancy, illness, poverty, and crime. Funding
includes private sources and a few state contracts. Some families
36 John McCormick and Vern E. Smith, "Can We Get Along?" Newsweek,
November 9, 1992, pp. 70-72.
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pay for the counseling, if they can, while most contribute a very
small membership fee. The organization is composed of community
members dedicated to helping their neighbors.
While the needs of the families and community are constantly
changing as demography shifts, so do the programs within the Family
Center. The Family Center has a history of recognizing that it is
vital to create new programs that develop from a thorough
understanding of what new groups and the community need. The
families come to the center on their own accord. Each case receives
a special approach to promote the necessary healing.
Training is a major commitment of all the teams at the Family
Center. Each year, interns come from area schools to receive
intensive training and supervision in family-based approaches for
developing their professional models of human service. Plans are in
the process for a collaborative training program with other
community groups such as teachers, medical staff, and social
workers who recognize a need to understand the challenges faced by
families, and to be able to identify their potential strengths. The
existence of such training programs provide an excellent opportunity
for strong collaborations and subsequent policy impact. The
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ultimate goal is to work with the community towards developing
self sustaining support networks.
Endless causes calling for a community to take action and
organize exist. A motivating factor is necessary to serve as the
proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. It is the citizenry who
must identify the factor to truly be effective; it is the citizenry
who must mobilize for action. TWO, aBA, and the Family Center
serve as successful examples of this process coming together.
Dubuque, like many other communities, must keep these goals in
sight in order to achieve success.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
What community organizations are trying to accomplish, with
each of their varying degrees of empowerment is to encourage their
local governments to recognize the dignity and integrity of each
individual within these groups that are organized in a spirit of
cooperation around common interests. Flexibility is the key to
dealing with the diverse elements which compromise the whole.
Through linkages with responsive and accommodative local
governments arrangements for change and improvement by and for
citizen groups may be accomplished.
Rather than regarding a community organization as the
undermining of a government's legitimacy, it should be recognized as
the creation of new channels for expressing old grievances.
According to Ted Gurr, "Men who have alternate ways to obtain their
goals are less likely to become aggressive when one way is blocked
90
than those who have few alternatives."1 The whole process of
solving problems in the cities is the finding of alternatives to the
existing situations. The alternatives can be found within each of the
citizens, without returning to the Horatio Alger theory. How each
community organization enables itself is dependent upon the
dedication of its members and the existence of a belief in the
democratic system.
How a local government responds to a community
organization is contingent on the group's success at creating an
organized force with positive impact. Ideally the response would be
the modification of control to enable the community group to have
some form of influence with the local power structure. The
governments can create a structural change so as to develop more
systematic and effective channels for local influence. In the
process of incorporating community organizations into the system,
such structural changes might lessen residents' feelings of
powerlessness. Ultimately, the reason for socially disruptive
tactics, like riots, may be diminished.
1 Ted Gurr, "Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of
Civil Strife," Riots and Rebellions, ed. Louis H. Masotti and Dan R. Bowen
(California: Sage Publications, Inc.), pp.51-68.
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There are definite limitations of empowerment for both the
models presented. The difference is how the models confront their
limitations. The plug was pulled on CAP and the OEO thus
eliminating any potential response to their limitations. With
Alinsky's particular form of citizen-action organization limitations
are everywhere from lack of funding to consistently unresponsive
local governments. Adaptations become necessary for the
organizations to overcome the institutional and ideological barriers
that confront them. In the opinion of Mike Miller (1973), a former
Alinsky organizer, "the organizations must become political if they
are to make the necessary changes.u2 TWO chose another strategy
by "recognizing the inadequacies of a primarily protest strategy,
[and moving] in the direction of greater emphasis on community
developmental strategies. u3
The nature of the Alinsky approach's emphasis on localism is a
significant organizational barrier. The barrier is best dealt with by
erecting responsive linkages to the government at the local level.
2 Mike Miller, "Notes on Institutional Necessary Changes," Social
Policy (November/December, January/February): 36-43.
3 Lancourt, p. 172.
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Enabling commu'nity organizations does not do away with the
existing obligations a government has to its citizens. A new order
can be established with social programs that take root in
responsible communities interacting with local governments, i.e. at
community-wide meetings with citizens and public officials
engaging in open discourse.
Limitations to any form of community group will always exist
since those in power will never voluntarily relinquish that power.
Thus the fundamental question for the citizens who desire change to
address is IIHow can we mobilize sufficient support for changes so
that these changes may be implemented and sustained?1I The answer
to that question depends on the incorporation of pragmatic social
action with the citizenry in the spirit of democratic theory. The
absence of any of these elements results only in continuation of the
status quo.
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